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Strategic human capital research explores heterogeneity in firm performance 
based on differences in firms’ abilities to leverage human capital.  Much of the discussion 
in this literature focuses on how firms can exploit isolating mechanisms that limit the 
mobility of employees.  This dissertation studies two important facets of strategic human 
capital research related to the mobility of employees.  The first essay explores how a 
labor market frictions lens can connect the strategic human capital literature to the 
employee entrepreneurship literature, two complementary but largely disparate 
literatures.  The examination of the impact of various labor market frictions on employee 
mobility to competitor firms and employee transitions to entrepreneurship suggests that 
the outcomes of some frictions are divergent across the two literatures, the outcomes of 
some are aligned, and the outcomes of some are ambiguous.  The complex interplay of 
labor market frictions provides opportunities for future research specifically exploring the 
intersection of the strategic human capital and employee entrepreneurship literatures.   
 
The second essay of explores how multi-location firms facilitate the spread of 
compensation increases across labor markets. Prior research cites the threat of employee 
mobility as the primary mechanism for the spread of compensation increases across 
locations.  Multi-location firms that straddle more than one labor market, however, must 
manage employees across labor markets.  I propose that internal firm processes, including 
social comparison between employees of the firm in different locations, may lead firms to 
raise compensation for employees in other locations when addressing competitive 
pressure in a given location. In doing so, these multi-location firms put pressure on local 
labor market competitors to also raise compensation, leading to compensation increases 
across distinct labor markets without reference to mobility constraints that dominate the 
strategic human capital literature.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic human capital research examines how firms leverage valuable human capital to 
gain and maintain a sustainable competitive advantage (Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; 
Hatch & Dyer, 2004).  This literature has its roots in the resource-based view of the firm, which 
suggests that resources that are rare, difficult to imitate, nonsubstitutable, and valuable can be a 
source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Barney & Wright, 1998; Castanias & Helfat, 
1991).  To the extent human capital fits these criteria, it can be a source of competitive advantage 
for the firm (Chadwick, 2017; Hatch & Dyer, 2004).  But, this literature also recognizes that 
human capital is unique as a firm resource—human capital is contained in people with agency 
who can demand pay increases and quit their jobs if their demands are not met (Blyler & Coff, 
2003; Coff, 1999).  The ability of employees to leave firms makes it difficult for firms to create 
and sustain a human capital-based competitive advantage (Coff, 1997, 1999).   
Because the threat of mobility can undermine a human capital-based competitive 
advantage, the strategic human capital literature generally views employee mobility as a negative 
consequence for firms.  Therefore, a primary focus of the strategic human capital literature 
became identifying the isolating mechanisms that firms could exploit to constrain employee 
mobility (e.g., Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009; Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Starr, Frake, & 
Agarwal, 2017).  With mobility constraints in place, firms are able to retain human capital for 
less than its use value and generate economic rents.  The strategic human capital literature, 
therefore, draws deeply on labor market frictions as a potential source of the isolating 
mechanisms (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Chadwick, 2017).   
A relatively new but growing stream of literature has examined the causes and 
consequences of employee mobility from existing firms to entrepreneurship (e.g., Agarwal, 
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Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004; Franco & Filson, 2006; Hamilton, 2000; Hellmann, 2007; 
Klepper, 2009).  This literature also relies on labor market friction logic.  In this literature, 
however, mobility to entrepreneurship is not viewed negatively.  For example, labor market 
frictions that constrain mobility of employees to existing firms may increase the likelihood of 
mobility to entrepreneurship (Rajshree Agarwal, Gambardella, & Olson, 2016; Buenstorf, Engel, 
Fischer, & Gueth, 2016; Campbell, Ganco, Franco, & Agarwal, 2012; Carnahan, 2017; 
Carnahan, Agarwal, & Campbell, 2012).  
The strategic human capital literature and the employee entrepreneurship literature are 
complementary but have developed largely independently.  The first essay of this dissertation 
attempts to bridge these two literatures using a market frictions lens.  Although these literatures 
leverage labor market friction logic in different ways, from different perspectives, and with 
different objectives, bridging the two allows us to develop answers to research questions 
regarding the antecedents and consequences of human capital value capture.  This study links 
these literatures through their shared focus on market frictions and suggests areas where 
researchers can contribute to the firm-level consequences of entrepreneurial mobility and how 
managers and policy makers shape the interaction of individuals and firms.   
In the second essay of this dissertation, I move beyond labor market frictions and the 
focus on mobility constraints to explore how social processes that are internal to the firm, and 
not dependent on mobility constraints, impact the ability of employees to appropriate value by 
receiving increased compensation.  Traditional explanations of the spread of wage increases 
across local labor markets focus on labor market competition and mobility as explanations 
(Moretti, 2011):  As compensation increases in a given location, the threat of losing employees 
to that location causes firms located elsewhere to also increase compensation in order to retain 
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their employees.  While this mechanism may certainly lead to compensation increases, other 
social processes that do not rely on mobility may also play a part.  Specifically, multi-location 
firms must manage employees across locations and so must worry about more than just local 
labor market pressures.  When facing local labor market pressures to raise compensation, they 
must consider how their employees located in other markets will react if some of the firm’s 
employees receive compensation increases and others do not.  Although office boundaries may 
lessen the possibility of social comparison, prior research shows that employees within firms, 
even if not co-located, may compare themselves to each other (Kacperczyk, Beckman, & 
Moliterno, 2013; Obloj & Zenger, 2017).  These comparisons may give rise to social comparison 
costs (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008).  In order to avoid potential social comparison costs, the firm 
may be compelled to raise wages for employees in locations that are not experiencing salary 
increases.  If multi-location firms raise compensation for employees in their other locations, this 
will likely, in turn, put pressure on their local labor market competitors to also increase 
compensation for their employees.  As a novel mechanism for the spread of compensation 
increases, I propose, therefore, that local labor market competition may interact with social 
comparison processes internal to multi-location firms and result in the spillover of compensation 
increases across otherwise distinct labor markets.  
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BRIDGING STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL AND EMPLOYEE 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH:  
A LABOR MARKET FRICTIONS APPROACH 
Co-Authored with Benjamin Campbell and David Kryscynski 
Introduction 
The strategic human capital literature is largely focused on explaining heterogeneity in 
performance based on differences in firms’ abilities to leverage valuable human capital (Barney, 
1991; Barney & Wright, 1998; Castanias & Helfat, 1991).  Accordingly, the strategic human 
capital literature brings from its strategy roots a focus on firm performance heterogeneity and 
from its human capital roots a focus on employee mobility.1  In this literature, mobility is viewed 
primarily as a threat to firms because it represents the loss of valuable human capital that might 
be important for firm capabilities and performance (Coff, 1997).  Thus, the strategic human 
capital literature has emphasized the critical role of labor market frictions in constraining 
mobility of human capital and, therefore, facilitating sustained human capital-based competitive 
advantages (Campbell, Coff, et al., 2012; Chadwick, 2017). 
In contrast, the employee entrepreneurship literature brings from its entrepreneurship 
roots a focus on understanding the formation of new ventures and the economic outcomes of 
innovation and from its roots on the agency of individual entrepreneurs a focus on mobility 
choices of potential founders.  As such, the employee entrepreneurship literature is largely 
focused on understanding the conditions that cause employees to leave employment in order to 
found their own firms and the economic and personal consequences of those entrepreneurial 
                                                 
1 For a recent review of the expansive literature on employee mobility, please see Mawdsley and Somaya 
(2016). 
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actions.  In this literature, mobility is viewed primarily as a positive outcome because it is 
associated with greater economic returns for the individual entrepreneurs (Campbell, 2013; 
Hamilton, 2000; Hellmann, 2007), enhanced performance of newly created firms (Agarwal et al., 
2004; Chatterji, 2009; Franco & Filson, 2006; Klepper, 2009; Sakakibara & Balasubramanian, 
2017), and flows of knowledge and innovations that benefit markets and geographic regions as a 
whole (Agarwal, Audretsch, & Sarkar, 2010; Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Berchicci, King, & Tucci, 
2011; Chatterji, Glaeser, & Kerr, 2013; Gambardella & Giarratana, 2010).  From this 
perspective, employee entrepreneurship research has focused on how various labor market 
frictions may increase or decrease the propensity of potential entrepreneurs to leave their jobs 
and found new firms.    
We visually depict the relationships among these literatures in Figure 1.  Strategic human 
capital scholarship exists at the intersection of the strategy and employee mobility literatures, 
while employee entrepreneurship scholarship exists at the intersection of the entrepreneurship 
and employee mobility literatures.  We highlight that strategic human capital scholarship and 
employee entrepreneurship scholarship both draw on the market friction logic embedded in the 
employee mobility literature, but focus on different objectives and outcomes of interest.  
Accordingly, we see an opportunity to link these two theoretical conversations through the 
language and logic of labor market frictions and, in so doing, to explore the intersection between 
strategic human capital and employee entrepreneurship research. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In the sections that follow, we provide a short overview and summary of labor market 
friction logic and briefly review how each friction manifests in the strategic human capital and 
employee entrepreneurship literatures.  Our review suggests that in some instances the outcomes 
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of these frictions diverge across literatures, in other instances they align across literatures, and in 
other instances the extent of alignment or divergence is unclear or ambiguous.  We then identify 
opportunities for future research explicitly focused on the intersection of the strategic human 
capital and employee entrepreneurship literatures.   
Labor Market Frictions 
Market frictions are imperfections in product or factor markets that inhibit perfect 
competition (Mahoney & Qian, 2013).  Economic theory suggests that in perfectly competitive 
markets, economic rents are unattainable.  By preventing perfectly competitive market outcomes, 
market frictions can facilitate rent creation and rent capture by market participants.  In both the 
strategic human capital and employee entrepreneurship literatures, understanding how market 
frictions in labor markets impact the mobility of employees into and out of firms is a key 
concern.  
A common theme across strategic human capital theory is that labor market frictions that 
constrain voluntary employee mobility are necessary for firms to capture value from employees.  
Valuable human can be very difficult to obtain or imitate and yet may be particularly important 
for achieving a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Castanias & Helfat, 1991).  Unlike other 
strategic resources and capabilities that the firm can build, borrow, and/or buy in the market, 
human capital is embedded in individuals with agency (Coff, 1997).  These individuals can 
choose to leave their employers for any number of reasons and for any number of alternative 
destinations, and when they do, they take their valuable human capital and relationships with 
them (Carnahan & Somaya, 2013; Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2010; Raffiee, 2017; Somaya, 
Williamson, & Lorinkova, 2008).  This threat of voluntary employee mobility, which is not 
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present in other strategic factor markets, is one source of the managerial dilemmas that firms face 
when dealing with this unique firm resource (Coff, 1997).  
Similarly, employee entrepreneurship research explores how labor market frictions 
impact the decisions of employees to leave employment to start a new venture.  The employee 
entrepreneurship literature generally views entrepreneurship as a career choice (Douglas & 
Shepherd, 2000): potential entrepreneurs consider their opportunities (Sorensen & Sharkey, 
2014) and their opportunity costs (Amit, Muller, & Cockburn, 1995) and then choose to become 
an entrepreneur and stay an entrepreneur (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997) as long as that 
choice enhances the entrepreneur’s utility.  Labor market frictions, therefore, that limit the utility 
of employees at their current employer, or constrain the ability of employees to gain utility from 
founding a new firm, fundamentally shape the career choices of potential employee 
entrepreneurs. 
In their exploration of the role of market frictions in driving the dominant theoretical 
perspectives found in the strategy literature, Mahoney and Qian (2013) categorize market 
frictions and provide insights into how market frictions shape rent creation and appropriation.  
We adapt the logic and framing of Mahoney and Qian (2013) to explore how key labor market 
frictions impact outcomes in both strategic human capital and employee entrepreneurship 
research.  Because employees are themselves strategic actors with agency, the market frictions 
that impact labor markets are often more nuanced and varied and the consequences more 
complicated than for market frictions in other strategic factor markets.  We also emphasize that 
the outcomes in labor markets may differ from those in other strategic factor markets because 
employees can potentially start their own new firms, an outcome not available in other markets.  
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Table 1 contains our review of the strategic human capital and employee 
entrepreneurship research that explicitly or implicitly leverages labor market friction logic to 
explain constraints on employee mobility.  The table provides a broad (but by no means 
complete) review of the labor market frictions common to the literatures on mobility and 
employee entrepreneurship.  Each row describes a friction, provides references to research in 
both literatures, and provides a high-level assessment of the effect of that particular friction in 
the extant literature.  The last column indicates the extent to which the employee mobility and 
employee entrepreneurship outcomes discussed in these literatures appear aligned or divergent, 
based on our review.  In the sections below, we briefly discuss each row of Table 1.  We group 
the frictions according to whether their impact on employee mobility and employee 
entrepreneurship is divergent, aligned, or ambiguous.  Again, we stress that this is an incomplete 
list of labor market frictions designed to identify opportunities for future research. 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Divergent Labor Market Frictions 
Human Capital Specificity.  A primary market friction explored in the employee mobility 
literature is co-specialized human capital.  Two assets are co-specialized if they each create more 
value when combined with the other (Teece, 1986).  In the context of human capital, co-
specialized human capital arises when the worker invests in knowledge, skills, and abilities that 
are uniquely valuable in the context of the firm’s idiosyncratic resources and capabilities 
(Becker, 1964; Molloy & Barney, 2015).  Co-specialized human capital is useful for the firm 
because it underlies many of the firm’s competitive capabilities (Mahoney & Kor, 2015), but 
also because it limits the employees’ outside options.  Other firms are less likely to benefit from 
the employees’ highly co-specialized skills and, accordingly, may not compensate employees for 
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those skills (Becker, 1964; Wang & Barney, 2006), therefore reducing the likelihood of 
employees moving to other firms (e.g., Coff and Raffiee, 2015; Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 
2009; Morris et al., 2017; Wang, He, and Mahoney, 2009).  The limited external market for 
specific human capital constrains the mobility of employees with firm-specific human capital.  
This reduces employee mobility to established firms limiting the ability of employees to leverage 
external offers to bid up their compensation. In turn, this potentially supports firms’ capture of 
human capital rents by allowing the employer to retain a valuable employee at a discount.  
In contrast, the employee entrepreneurship literature largely suggests that asset specificity 
of human capital may increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of employee 
entrepreneurship.  While other established firms may not be willing to compensate outside 
employees for their highly firm-specific human capital, employees can potentially leave their 
focal firms, start new firms, and re-create the relevant co-specialized assets at the new ventures.  
This mechanism is consistent with the findings of Franco and Filson (2006), Campbell et al. 
(2012), and Carnahan (2017), which demonstrate that while investments in firm-specific human 
capital may limit the likelihood of turnover overall, employees with high levels of firm-specific 
human capital are more likely to pursue entrepreneurship when they do choose to leave their 
current employer. 
Social Complexity.  Coff (1997) highlights that firm-specific human capital is often 
manifest in the tacit knowledge embedded in social relationships and social culture.  In other 
words, when employees are entrenched in a specific social structure they are able to create more 
value than in alternative social structures.  While the tacit knowledge of socially complex 
relationships is relationship-specific and not necessarily firm-specific, being embedded in a 
socially complex team makes it harder for alternate employers to transfer the value created by 
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that team into their organization (Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008).  The 
team members would all need to move together and adapt their shared routines to the new 
context (Marx & Timmermans, 2014; Selby & Mayer, 2013), which is potentially costly because 
the new employees’ routines may disrupt existing routines (Campbell, Saxton, & Bannerjee, 
2014) and incumbent firms may resist adopting new routines (Madsen, Mosakowski, & Zaheer, 
2003).  As a consequence, production that occurs in socially complex teams reduces the threat of 
mobility, allowing firms to retain knowledge embedded in team members at a discount (Grant, 
1996).   
This constraint, however, may be less important when starting a de novo organization.  
First, employee entrepreneurs are typically higher performing employees (Campbell, Ganco, et 
al., 2012; Klepper & Thompson, 2010) and are thus better able to rally teammates to move with 
them (R Agarwal, Campbell, Franco, & Ganco, 2016; Dahl & Sorenson, 2012) and take 
advantage of the collectively held knowledge of the team (Phillips, 2002; Wezel, Cattani, & 
Pennings, 2006).  Second, entrepreneurs start from a blank slate when designing social structure 
and organizational culture (Burton, Sørensen, & Beckman, 2002), thus the risk of conflicting 
routines between the moving team and incumbent employees, which devalues the socially-
embedded knowledge, is mitigated (Campbell et al., 2014).  Therefore, relative to a team-
embedded employee moving to an established firm, employee entrepreneurs may be better able 
to move with a team and transfer their socially-complex knowledge and they are better able to 
create value from that knowledge in a new organization.   
Information Asymmetry/Causal Ambiguity.  Asymmetric information may make it 
difficult for outside employers to observe and discern the quality of embedded employees, 
leading to causal ambiguity problems (Blyler & Coff, 2003; Polanyi, 1962; Reed & DeFillippi, 
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1990) and lemons problems (Salop & Salop, 1976).  In other words, it may be very difficult for 
external firms to know whether they are hiring an employee who will be valuable in their firm.  
This is particularly relevant when knowledge is complex and hard to assess externally (Ganco, 
2013) and when there is uncertainty on the efficacy and coverage of legal market constraints 
(Starr, Frake, et al., 2017).  When there are high levels of information asymmetries, hiring firms 
are less likely to poach employees and those who are actually high quality may face a lemons 
discount when they consider other options in the labor market, thus constraining employee 
mobility.  When information about the value of an employee becomes less ambiguous, for 
example through voluntary disclosures about value creation and value appropriation strategies of 
the firm, the likelihood that employees will be poached increases (Stern & James, 2016).  
However, information asymmetry problems in labor markets may encourage employee 
entrepreneurship.  While external employers may not be able to observe outside employees’ 
human capital, individuals do see and appreciate their own human capital.  Thus, when external 
firms will not pay for outside employees’ skills, these undervalued employees can potentially 
form a new firm and fully reap the benefits of their abilities.  When entrepreneurs have private 
expectations about their own skills and quality that exceed the expectations of the market, they 
are likely to pursue entrepreneurship (Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006; Lowe & Ziedonis, 
2006).  Similarly, while the complexity of knowledge possessed by employees (which is very 
hard for outside employers to see) reduces employee mobility, it is associated with an increase in 
employee entrepreneurship (Ganco, 2013). 
Thin Markets/Collusion.  Employee mobility is negatively related to the number of 
independent employers in the labor market. The fewer the number of external employers, the 
fewer options employees have on the external market and employee mobility is constrained. For 
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example, increased geographic dispersion of firms within an industry limits the mobility of 
employees (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Whittington, Owen-Smith, & Powell, 2009).  Similarly, the 
dissolution of competitor firms in an industry is also associated with a reduction in employee 
mobility (Carnahan, 2017).  In contrast, although dissolution of competitor firms may limit the 
mobility of employees to existing firms, it spurs entrepreneurship by employees of the surviving 
firms (Carnahan, 2017).  So, similar to the frictions identified above, this demand-side constraint 
likely limits movement from firm-to-firm, but by constraining the ability of employees to 
threaten mobility to bid up their compensation, thin markets may actually enhance the likelihood 
that employees will depart to start their own firms because entrepreneurship allows these 
individuals to circumvent this source of demand-side constraints. 
Aligned Labor Market Frictions 
Intellectual Property and Non-Competes.  Legal structures that prevent employees from 
taking knowledge from a firm reduce employee mobility.  For example, when firms implement 
non-compete agreements to constrain the ability of an employee to leave the firm and compete 
with the employer (Buenstorf et al., 2016; Starr, 2016) or threaten intellectual property 
enforcement to prevent an employee from using the firm’s knowledge in a different context 
(Ganco, Ziedonis, & Agarwal, 2015), they not only inhibit the willingness of employees to move 
to an existing firm (Agarwal et al., 2009; Fallick, Fleischman, & Rebitzer, 2006; Ganco et al., 
2015; Marx, 2011; Marx et al., 2009; Samila & Sorenson, 2011; Yeganegi, Laplume, Dass, & 
Huynh, 2016; Younge & Marx, 2015), they also inhibit employees from forming their own firms 
by preventing employee entrepreneurs from imitating important aspects of their parent firm 
(Anton & Yao, 1995; Yeganegi et al., 2016).  Intellectual property protection thus reduces the 
entrepreneurial aspirations of employees s (Autio & Acs, 2010) and constrains the ability of 
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employees to become entrepreneurs (Hellmann, 2007), especially if the parent firm values the 
intellectual property highly (Gambardella, Ganco, & Honoré, 2014).  Similarly, if they are 
enforceable, non-compete agreements increase the risks facing employee entrepreneurs and limit 
the value of the knowledge they can take with them to their new firm (Starr, Balasubramanian, & 
Sakakibara, 2017; Starr, Frake, et al., 2017).  Research suggests that non-competes may be 
effective even if they are not enforceable because they create an implicit contract for the 
employee that is psychically costly to break (Kryscynski & Starr, 2017).  This class of frictions 
ultimately has aligned effects in reducing mobility to both established firms and new ventures.  
Future Opportunities with Employer.  In contrast to the assumption that in competitive 
labor markets there are many homogeneous employers, in actual labor markets, employers vary 
with respect to the opportunities available within the firm.  As individual productivity and 
opportunities for career advancement increase within a firm, both mobility (Hoisl, 2007) and 
entrepreneurship (Cassiman & Ueda, 2006; Kacperczyk, 2013; Sorensen & Sharkey, 2014) are 
limited.  Career opportunities within firms lead to higher rates of internal promotion, which are 
associated with increased responsibility for employees (Bidwell & Mollick, 2015) and increased 
utility for the employees.  As employers increase the potential for promotion and increased 
authority within the firm, they decrease the likelihood of both mobility to established firms and 
to new ventures.  Similarly, as opportunities for advancement within a focal firm become more 
limited, employees will look to advance their careers by pursuing opportunities in other firms or 
by starting their own firms.  
Ambiguous Labor Market Frictions 
Mobility Costs.  Mobility costs can include both the costs of job search, bargaining, and 
switching as well as the opportunity cost associated with leaving the original job.  The negative 
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effect of mobility costs on employee mobility to established firms is clear: as mobility costs 
increase, the likelihood of changing jobs decreases (Kuhn & Skuterud, 2004; Stevenson, 2008).  
Similarly, as the opportunity cost of leaving a job increases the mobility rate decreases (Agarwal 
et al., 2009; Campbell, Ganco, et al., 2012; Sorensen & Sharkey, 2014; Whittington et al., 2009).  
However, the impact of mobility costs on employee entrepreneurship is less clear.  While, actual 
start-up costs of starting a new venture have a negative impact on entrepreneurship (Evans & 
Jovanovic, 1989), the impact of opportunity costs on new venture creation are less clear.  
Opportunity costs may negatively impact employee entrepreneurship because employees with 
high opportunity costs face more risk in starting a new venture (Agarwal, Campbell, Carnahan, 
& Choi, 2017; Agarwal et al., 2009), or they may positively impact employee entrepreneurship 
because employees with high opportunity costs may seek extreme rewards through 
entrepreneurship (Carnahan et al., 2012; Sorensen & Sharkey, 2014) or pursue hybrid 
entrepreneurship (Raffiee & Feng, 2014). 
Heterogeneous Employee Ability.  Just as differences between firms present frictions that 
impact employee mobility and entrepreneurship, employees themselves are not fungible, and 
differences between the employees create frictions in labor markets.  For example, employees 
differ according to their ability.  Studies examining the relationship between employee ability 
and employee mobility find mixed results.  In some cases, higher ability workers are found to be 
more likely to join competitor firms (Chatterji, de Figueiredo, & Rawley, 2016; Di Lorenzo & 
Almeida, 2017; Gambardella et al., 2014; Palomeras & Melero, 2010).  Other studies find that 
higher ability workers are less likely to leave for competitors (Campbell, Ganco, et al., 2012; 
Carnahan, 2017).  Employee ability, however, is consistently associated with higher rates of 
employee entrepreneurship (Campbell, Ganco, et al., 2012; Carnahan et al., 2012; Chatterji et al., 
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2016; Dahl & Sorenson, 2012; Elfenbein, Hamilton, & Zenger, 2010; Sorensen & Sharkey, 
2014).   
A Pathway to Greater Convergence 
Our summary of labor market frictions in both the strategic human capital and employee 
entrepreneurship literatures demonstrates how labor market frictions may provide a pathway for 
connecting and integrating these two streams of research.  We offer two messages in conclusion:  
First, we suggest a potential explanation for why in some cases we observe divergence between 
the strategic human capital and employee entrepreneurship literature.  Second, we identify 
avenues for future research that can more fully bring the insights from these literatures together.   
Why Might These Literatures Diverge? 
Scholars in the strategic human capital domain are generally interested in exploring the 
conditions under which firms are able to capture rents from human capital and gain a competitive 
advantage over their competitors.  Thus, while many strategic human capital studies leverage 
individual-level data and invoke individual-level theories, their primary research motivation is to 
explain firm-level differences across established firms.  This focus on established firms as the 
actors of interest may engender an implicit bias towards theoretical and empirical studies that 
examine mobility to established firms.  This perspective treats employee mobility as a negative 
outcome that should be constrained and leads scholars to systematically ignore the implications 
of entrepreneurship as an employment outcome.  In contrast, the employee entrepreneurship 
literature explores employees’ decisions to found their own firms and is implicitly built on the 
assumption that entrepreneurship is a career choice.  Thus, individuals are the actors of interest 
in this research and employee mobility is seen a positive outcome that enhances the utility of 
individuals, facilitates new venture performance, and drives knowledge flows and innovation. 
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Our review of these two literatures suggests an important boundary condition on research 
in the strategic human capital tradition.  Specifically, theories of how labor market frictions 
restrict mobility and enhance human capital-based competitive advantages may need to be 
limited to contexts in which entrepreneurship is not an attractive option for employees who are 
the source of human capital rents.  If entrepreneurship is a viable and potentially attractive 
options for firms’ employees, then strategic human capital theories need to address how 
entrepreneurship as a mobility destination alters assumptions about the relationship between 
labor market frictions, mobility, and human capital rents.  
Moving Towards Convergence 
We identify three key research areas that will leverage the market friction logic and 
deepen our understanding of the interaction between employee entrepreneurship and strategic 
human capital.  Specifically, we call for (1) a deeper analysis of how specific labor market 
frictions impact the ability of firms to capture human capital rents when employee 
entrepreneurship is a threat, (2) an exploration of the set of firm strategies that may constrain 
employee entrepreneurship, and (3) an analysis of how the matching of entrepreneurially-
inclined employees and employers is endogenous to the set of frictions present in a context.  
Human Capital Rents and Employee Entrepreneurship.  The omitted choice of employee 
entrepreneurship is important to a market friction logic because entrepreneurship provides a 
pathway for employees to navigate around labor market frictions that might otherwise limit their 
mobility.  Even if employees cannot threaten mobility to an existing firm in order to bargain for 
higher wages, they can threaten to start a new firm.  In some cases, the stronger the labor market 
frictions that reduce firm-to-firm mobility, the greater the attractiveness of entrepreneurship as a 
career choice.  Thus, a potential consequence of leveraging labor market frictions in pursuit of 
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human capital rents is that firms may inadvertently increase the incentives for their employees to 
become entrepreneurs, particularly if the affected employees are already inclined towards the 
rewards available through entrepreneurship.  The divergent effects associated with some labor 
market frictions in preventing employee mobility to established firms versus preventing 
employee entrepreneurship, therefore, presents an upper bound on how aggressively firms can 
leverage labor market frictions to appropriate value from their employees.   
There are also opportunities to study specific labor market frictions and examine how 
they shape employee mobility and employee entrepreneurship and the resulting impact on value 
capture by firms.  Our presentation of common labor market frictions is only at a high level and 
these discussions are cursory and incomplete and designed primarily to illustrate the potential 
underlying relationships.  More comprehensive research is necessary to explore the specific 
mechanisms underpinning the role of labor market frictions in providing a competitive advantage 
to firms while still constraining employee entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, it remains an open question whether the potential loss of employee 
entrepreneurs outweighs the benefits of leveraging labor market frictions to retain non-
entrepreneurially-inclined employees.  If these frictions allow the firm to hold on to non-
entrepreneurially-inclined employees at a discount but actually encourage entrepreneurially-
inclined employees to start their own firms, what does that mean for the overall human capital-
based competitive advantage for the firm?  While the mobility outcomes may diverge, it is not as 
clear, ex ante, whether the implications for competitive advantage also diverge.  There seems a 
fruitful path for future research exploring entrepreneurial mobility and the human capital rents of 
established firms simultaneously to help us more fully understand when and how these literatures 
align and diverge.   
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Connecting Employee Entrepreneurship to Firms’ Human Capital Approaches.  In a 
world where employee entrepreneurship is a threat to firms’ ability to capture human capital 
rents, firms may have to adapt new human capital management approaches to constrain the 
mobility of entrepreneurially-inclined employees.  If firms’ use of labor market frictions to 
constrain mobility to established firms may enhance the threat of employee entrepreneurship, the 
next step in the logic is to ask how can firms counteract the ability and willingness of 
entrepreneurially-inclined employees to leave to form a new venture?  The strategic human 
capital lens highlights that firms could respond to entrepreneurship threats by leveraging supply-
side frictions that decrease an employee’s willingness to leave and become an entrepreneur.  For 
example, firms may offer spin-off or intrapreneurship opportunities to employees whose mobility 
options with existing firms are limited, but who might otherwise become employee 
entrepreneurs.  These opportunities create supply-side constraints, incenting employees to remain 
with the existing employer rather than create new competitor firms.  In the sections that follow 
we briefly discuss several potential ways through which firms can reduce the entrepreneurship 
threats of employees, though there may be many more to explore in future research.     
Spin-off firms.  In a spin-off, a parent firm creates a new venture in which they maintain 
substantial equity.  Thus, the parent firm gives an entrepreneurially-inclined employee the 
greenlight to pursue an entrepreneurial opportunity, and further, makes an initial investment in 
exchange for equity in the new venture.  From the parent firm’s perspective, they do not 
completely lose the valuable employee because they retain some of the financial benefits from 
the human capital of the founder.  Additionally, they can “harvest” innovations from these 
ventures (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005) and learn about new technologies (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2006).  Firms benefit because they did not lose these employees to a competing venture or to a 
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rival (Burrows, 2012); the founders benefit because they reap the financial rewards (Hamilton, 
2000), meaning and purpose (Carnahan, Kryscynski, & Olson, 2017), autonomy (Roach & 
Sauermann, 2015), flexibility (Sørensen, 2007), responsibility (Elfenbein et al., 2010), and 
human capital development (Campbell, 2013) that can accompany entrepreneurship. 
Intrapreneurship.  Firms can also offer intrapreneurship opportunities to 
entrepreneurially-inclined employees.  In intrapreneurship, employees are given autonomy over 
and rewards from an innovative activity within the boundaries of the firm (Hellmann, 2007; 
Kacperczyk, 2013).  Intrapreneurs typically work closely with other units of the firm and have 
access to the complementary assets of the parent.  Again, the employer benefits by stimulating 
innovation and then owning the rights to those innovations.  Employees with entrepreneurial 
inclinations benefit because they receive at least some of the benefits associated with being an 
entrepreneur. 
Through both spin-offs and intrapreneurship, firms leverage supply-side frictions to 
counteract the adverse effects that demand-side frictions impose on entrepreneurially-inclined 
employees.  By receiving many of the benefits associated with entrepreneurship while remaining 
associated with their current employer, entrepreneurially-inclined employees are less likely to 
seek out external entrepreneurial opportunities.  While these are just two examples of how 
understanding the antecedents and consequences of employee entrepreneurship can shape firms’ 
approaches to capturing human capital rents, there are rich avenues of future research exploring 
how firms can seek to neutralize the dilemmas associated with managing human capital that is 
free to leave and start a new venture. 
Labor Market Frictions and Employer-Employee Matches.  Much of the extant strategic 
human capital literature implicitly assumes that individuals are randomly assigned to firms.  
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However, it is likely that employees sort into firms based on the intensity of the frictions they 
anticipate experiencing at the firm.  For example, an employee with very low expected utility 
from entrepreneurship may be less willing to sort into a firm with high demand-side constraints 
than an employee with high expected utility from entrepreneurship.  The entrepreneurially-
inclined employee may be less sensitive to demand-side frictions because they always possess a 
credible exit threat.  As such, the intensity of demand-side frictions at a firm might shape the 
composition of the firm’s workforce. This highlights a path through which strategic human 
capital researchers can more deeply examine how frictions shape the process by which 
employees select into firms and how employees are motivated within firms. 
This logic is particularly salient at the regional-level and, therefore, for policy makers.  
As an example, consider Silicon Valley and Route 128. Saxenian's (1996) arguments suggest that 
demand-side constraints in the Route 128 area are on average more intense than demand-side 
constraints in Silicon Valley, which leads to relatively greater mobility in Silicon Valley.  
However, if we compare employees in each region that are identical on all dimensions except for 
the demand-side constraints they face in their region, our logic above suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, employees in Route 128 may be more likely to become entrepreneurs because they face 
more intense demand-side constraints.  However, it is difficult to make a ceteris paribus 
argument here because the higher average demand-side constraints in Route 128 reduce the 
ability of entrepreneurs to recruit other team members.  This in turn reduces the average expected 
utility from entrepreneurship in Route 128 relative to Silicon Valley, which leads to sorting of 
more entrepreneurially-inclined employees into Silicon Valley.  So, when aggregating to the 
regional level, demand-side constraints and expected utility from entrepreneurship may co-vary 
in predictable ways.  This suggests an opportunity to explore how policy makers can shape the 
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labor market frictions within a region in order to stimulate employee entrepreneurship and attract 
entrepreneurially-inclined individuals into the region.   
Conclusion 
The extant strategic human capital literature is built on a theoretical foundation that 
draws deeply on labor market friction logic.  So, also, is the extant literature on employee 
entrepreneurship.  However, these literatures leverage labor market friction logic in distinctly 
different ways, from distinctly different perspectives, and with distinctly different objectives.  
Nevertheless, bridging these literatures can provide a foundation for developing richer answers 
to a variety of research questions regarding the antecedents and consequences of human capital 
value capture when employee entrepreneurship is a threat.  By linking these literatures through 
their shared focus on market frictions, researchers can contribute to the understanding of how 
entrepreneurial mobility has firm-level consequences, how firms’ quests for human capital rents 
can enable or constrain employee entrepreneurship, and how managers and policy makers can 
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Table 1: Common Labor Market Frictions and Their Impact on Employee Mobility 




Description Impact on Alignment? 
Employee Mobility Employee 
Entrepreneurship 
Firm Specificity and 
Complementary 
Assets 
Demand-side friction arising 
when the worker invests in 
knowledge, skills and 
abilities that are uniquely 
valuable in the context of the 
firm’s idiosyncratic resource 
and capability bundles.  
Negative 
(Becker, 1964; Coff & 
Raffiee, 2015; Mahoney 
& Kor, 2015; Marx et 
al., 2009; Morris et al., 
2017; Wang & Barney, 
2006; Wang et al., 
2009) 
Positive 
(Campbell, Ganco, et al., 
2012; Carnahan, 2017; 
Franco & Filson, 2006) 
Divergent 
Social Complexity Demand-side friction caused 
when employee value stems 
from shared routines among 
socially complex teams. 
Negative 
(Campbell et al., 2014; 
Groysberg & Lee, 2009; 
Groysberg et al., 2008; 
Madsen et al., 2003) 
Positive 
(R Agarwal et al., 2016; 
Dahl & Sorenson, 2012; 






Demand-side friction arising 
when it is difficult for 
outside observers to observe 
and discern the quality of 
employees, leading to causal 
ambiguity and a lemons 
problem. 
Negative 
(Blyler & Coff, 2003; 
Ganco, 2013; Starr, 
Frake, et al., 2017; 
Stern & James, 2016) 
Positive 
(Ganco, 2013; Hayward 






because there are a limited 
number of alternative 
employers in a market. 
Negative 
(Almeida & Kogut, 
1999; Carnahan, 2017; 










Table 1 Continued 
Labor Market 
Friction 
Description Impact on Alignment? 






side frictions based on 
legal protections of a 
firm's knowledge and 
intellectual property. 
Negative 
(Agarwal et al., 2009; Fallick et 
al., 2006; Ganco et al., 2015; 
Marx, 2011; Marx et al., 2009; 
Samila & Sorenson, 2011; 
Yeganegi et al., 2016; Younge 
& Marx, 2015) 
Negative 
(Agarwal et al., 2009; Anton & 
Yao, 1995; Buenstorf et al., 
2016; Hellmann, 2007; Starr, 
Balasubramanian, et al., 2017; 






arising from credible 
future opportunities 
available at employer. 
Negative 
(Bidwell & Mollick, 2015; 
Carnahan et al., 2012; Hoisl, 
2007) 
Negative 
(Carnahan et al., 2012; 
Cassiman & Ueda, 2006; 
Kacperczyk, 2013; Sorensen & 
Sharkey, 2014) 
Aligned 
Mobility Costs Supply-side friction 
reflecting the costs to 
an employee of 




(Agarwal et al., 2009; 
Campbell, Ganco, et al., 2012; 
Kuhn & Skuterud, 2004; 
Sorensen & Sharkey, 2014; 
Whittington et al., 2009) 
Negative 
(Agarwal et al., 2009) 
Positive 
(Campbell, Ganco, et al., 2012; 
Raffiee & Feng, 2014; 







arising from thinner 
markets for low- and 
high-ability employees. 
Negative 
(Campbell, Ganco, et al., 2012; 
Carnahan et al., 2012) 
Positive 
(Chatterji et al., 2016; Di 
Lorenzo & Almeida, 2017; 
Ganco et al., 2015; Palomeras & 
Melero, 2010) 
Positive 
(Campbell, Ganco, et al., 2012; 
Carnahan et al., 2012; Chatterji 
et al., 2016; Dahl & Sorenson, 
2012; Elfenbein et al., 2010; 





THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL COMPARISON ON COMPENSATION IN MULTI-
LOCATION FIRMS 
 
“Twin Cities law firms with offices in other cities . . . face internal strife if they 
raise salaries there but not here.” – From an article in a business periodical 
discussing law firm compensation increases in Minneapolis, MN (Jean, 2000). 
Introduction 
Firm choices regarding employee compensation can have a substantial impact on 
firm performance.  Compensation is the primary determinant of a firm’s ability to attract 
and hire desired employees (Bidwell, 2011; Kampkötter & Sliwka, 2014) and an 
important means for incentivizing and retaining them (Bartel, Cardiff-Hicks, & Shaw, 
2013; Campbell, Ganco, et al., 2012; Carnahan et al., 2012; Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 
2002; Stiglitz, 1976).  Employee compensation, however, also represents a substantial 
cost for most firms (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003) and is the primary way in which employees 
appropriate value from the firm (Coff, 1999).  Prior literature suggests that firms have an 
opportunity to generate a human capital-based competitive advantage when they can 
successfully limit compensation without a commensurate reduction in the value 
employees create (Campbell, Coff, et al., 2012; Chadwick & Dabu, 2009; Coff, 1997).   
Competition for employees, particularly within local labor markets, constrains 
firm choices regarding employee compensation:  The threat of employee mobility to 
competitors limits the firm’s ability to pay less than market wages (Lazear & Oyer, 
2004).  Consequently, the strategic human capital literature has primarily focused on how 
firms can exploit circumstances or phenomena that constrain employee mobility in order 
to generate economic rents (Hatch & Dyer, 2004).  But, these studies generally do not 
consider the impact of factors internal to firms that also influence employee 
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compensation.  For example, social processes, including social comparison and envy 
among employees (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008), may significantly affect compensation 
decisions within firms even when the risk of employee mobility to competitors is low. 
In this paper, I extend our understanding of the drivers and consequences of firm 
decisions on employee compensation by exploring the interaction between labor market 
competition external to the firm and processes internal to the firm that impact 
compensation.  Prior research suggests that compensation dispersion among comparable 
employees within an establishment of a firm may lead to negative outcomes for firms 
(Kacperczyk & Balachandran, 2018; Obloj & Zenger, 2017).  I extend this logic and 
suggest that multi-location firms, when responding to local market pressures to raise 
compensation for employees in one location, may also face internal pressures to raise 
compensation for employees in their other locations even when there is no corresponding 
market pressure on compensation in the other locations.  Internal pressures that drive this 
effect may include social processes like employee equity and fairness considerations that 
could arise if some employees receive compensation increases and others do not (Akerlof 
& Yellen, 1988; Baker, Gibbs, & Holmstrom, 1994; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; 
Nickerson & Zenger, 2008; O’Reilly, III, Main, & Crystal, 1988) or may be a result of 
firm-specific compensation and human resources policies that standardize pay across a 
firm’s locations (e.g., Baker et al., 1994), although policies that standardize pay are also 
likely an attempt to mitigate potential social comparisons and reduce comparison costs.  
If multi-location firms raise compensation for employees in their other locations, this will 
likely, in turn, put pressure on their local labor market competitors to also increase 
compensation for their employees.  As a novel mechanism for the spread of 
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compensation increases across otherwise distinct labor markets, I propose, therefore, that 
local labor market competition may interact with social comparison processes internal to 
multi-location firms to result in the spillover of wage increases across the locations.   
This research suggests that simply reducing the threat of employee mobility may 
not be sufficient for firms to develop a human capital-based competitive advantage.  
Multi-location firms, in particular, may need to consider how internal firm processes, 
including equity considerations and social comparison among their employees, could 
drive compensation decisions across the firm.  Additionally, firms competing in the same 
labor market as multi-location firms must be aware of how labor market competition in 
other locations might, through processes internal to multi-location firms, create 
competitive pressure on compensation for their own employees.  
Theoretical Framework 
  Heterogeneity in Compensation 
Labor is a basic input of economic productivity.  Neoclassical economic theory 
suggests that in labor markets, as in markets for other goods or services, the law of one 
price—that in competitive markets, identical workers performing the same work will be 
paid the same—should hold.  But, even the most cursory examination of employee 
compensation, and a large body of academic research, suggests that this is generally not 
the case.  Both across as well as within firms, similar workers performing similar 
functions often get paid very differently (Akerlof & Yellen, 1988; Cohn, Fehr, Herrmann, 
& Schneider, 2011; Falk, Fehr, & Zehnder, 2006). 
A variety of theories have been proposed to explain the heterogeneity in pay.  
Some point to frictions in labor markets that might explain the differences.  For example, 
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literature building on Becker’s (1964) theory of specific human capital suggests that 
differences in pay arise because workers’ knowledge and skills are not equally valuable 
across employers.  To the extent that the employee’s human capital is firm specific and 
therefore particularly valuable for a given firm, the value of the employee’s human 
capital in the market will be less than the value to that firm.  The firm will be willing to 
pay the employee marginally more than other potential employers, and the employee will 
choose to take the marginally higher compensation and remain with the firm.  The firm 
will earn economic rents on the difference between the employee’s compensation and the 
value to the firm of the employee’s human capital.  Strategic human capital literature has 
largely focused on how constraints on mobility of employees such as firm-specificity of 
human capital, can serve as the basis for a sustainable competitive advantage (Campbell, 
Coff, et al., 2012; Campbell, Ganco, et al., 2012; Chadwick & Dabu, 2009; Hatch & 
Dyer, 2004; Wang et al., 2009).  Other firm-specific factors unrelated to the human 
capital of a given employee may also drive the differences in employee compensation 
both within and across firms.  For example, firm-specific wage policies in which firms tie 
compensation to a particular job or job title rather than to an individual employee may 
also explain some of the heterogeneity in compensation (Baker et al., 1994).   
Social scientists, including management scholars, economists, psychologists, and 
sociologists have also suggested that social comparisons within firms, which are related 
to notions of what is fair and equitable, also influence employee compensation.  Building 
on Adam’s (1963) equity theory, organizational behavior and psychology scholars have 
developed theories, including the concept of distributive justice, that look at the negative 
individual- and firm-level consequences of employee perceptions of inequitable 
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distribution of resources, particularly pay, among employees (e.g., Alexander & 
Ruderman, 1987; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Scott, Garza, Conlon, & Kim, 2014).  
Similarly, scholars have found that the tendency of individuals to compare themselves to 
others, particularly on pay, is pervasive both inside and outside the firm (e.g., Baron and 
Pfeffer, 1994; Festinger, 1954; McGinn and Milkman, 2012).  To the extent they perceive 
differences, employees may increase their level of effort and productivity if doing so 
helps them obtain a payout that the employee deems appropriate when compared to what 
others are receiving (Kacperczyk, Beckman, & Moliterno, 2014; Shaw et al., 2002; Stark 
& Hyll, 2012).  Alternatively, and more commonly, employee comparisons to others lead 
to feelings of envy and inequity and they perceive that they are being unfairly 
compensated (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008).  Research suggests that these envious 
employees will take actions to reduce the inequity (Adams, 1963).  They may reduce 
their level of effort (until they feel that their level of effort corresponds to their level of 
pay), engage in theft or workplace sabotage, or simply quit their jobs (Alexander & 
Ruderman, 1987; Card, Mas, Moretti, & Saez, 2012; Gächter & Thöni, 2010; Greenberg, 
1990; Wade, O’Reilly, III, & Pollock, 2006).  Each of these actions imposes costs on 
employers—following Nickerson and Zenger (2008), I refer to these costs as “social 
comparison costs.” 
A common firm response to these internal social processes is to compress 
compensation, often both within and across positions within the firm (Akerlof & Yellen, 
1990; Zenger, 1992).  Changes in compensation may be initiated by an employer’s desire 
to treat employees fairly and equitably or arise from the potential threat that employees 
will impose social comparison costs on their employers if they do not feel fairly treated.  
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By compressing salaries, firms decouple pay and performance and reduce differences in 
compensation that could be perceived as inequitable.  
Local Labor Markets and Multi-Location Firms 
Because labor markets are generally local in nature (Moretti, 2011), firms with 
multiple locations have to manage employees across these locations and may face 
different labor market conditions in each location where they operate.  If labor market 
competition results in a substantial increase in compensation for employees in one 
market, the threat of employee mobility within that labor market will put pressures on 
firms to also increase the pay of their employees in those locations.  Without isolating 
mechanisms that would otherwise impede the mobility of employees, employers must 
either increase compensation to meet that of other firms or risk losing their employees.   
The decision of an employer to respond to labor market competition is not taken 
in isolation.  Employers must consider how raising compensation for some employees, 
but not for others, will impact their employees—they must balance external labor market 
competition with internal firm processes in developing their compensation strategies.  
Moreover, even though labor market competition is generally local, potential for social 
comparison costs may extend across geographic locations (boundaries of the firm, even 
across multiple locations, provide a salient basis for comparison on wages (Kacperczyk et 
al., 2014; Obloj & Zenger, 2017)).  Therefore, if employees in one location of the firm 
receive higher pay, the firm may also raise compensation for comparable employees in 
other locations, either in keeping with firm policies or to ensure fair and equitable 
treatment of employees and avoid potential social comparison costs.  I refer to the 
locations of the firm that do not experience increased compensation due to local labor 
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market competition themselves, but are exposed to it directly as another establishment of 
the same firm, as “directly exposed establishments.” 
Proposition 1: Following increases in compensation due to competition in a local 
labor market, firms in the market that also have employees in other locations (their 
directly exposed establishments) will increase compensation for employees in their 
directly exposed establishments even if there is no wage pressure from the local labor 
market competition in those other locations.  
Social Comparisons, Salient Referents, and the Likelihood of Compensation 
Increases 
In making social comparisons, not everyone is a salient referent.  Aristotle 
recognized this when he stated: “We envy those who are near us in time, place, age, or 
reputation” (Rhetoric, 1388, quoted in Nickerson & Zenger, 2008).  Research on social 
comparisons suggests that Aristotle was correct—employees are particularly likely to 
select as salient referents others who are demographically similar, who are physically 
proximate, with whom they interact regularly, and about whom they have information 
(e.g., Festinger, 1954; Kulik & Ambrose, 1992).  When the compensation of salient 
referents changes, employees are more likely to perceive inequity and to impose social 
comparison costs on their employer (Kacperczyk & Balachandran, 2018; Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2008).  Therefore, the likelihood that compensation changes in one establishment 
of a firm may increase the risk of social comparison costs imposed by employees in other 
establishments, and therefore cause changes in wages for those employees in other 
establishments, will increase as the employees see those that have received compensation 
increases as salient referents. 
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Demographic Similarity.  Research suggests that people tend to separate groups 
into social categories and are more likely to compare themselves to others with whom 
they share a category (Blanton, Crocker, & Miller, 2000).  Demographic characteristics 
are commonly used as the bases for these social categories and employees who are 
demographically similar are more likely to select others within their category as salient 
referents (Cobb & Stevens, 2017; Festinger, 1954).  People tend to assume that those 
with whom they share demographic characteristics are also similar on other dimensions 
related to achievement (Gibson & Lawrence, 2010).  Therefore, I predict that the 
likelihood that compensation increases for employees in one establishment will lead to 
invidious social comparisons by employees in other establishments will increase as the 
employees across establishments are increasingly similar. 
Proposition 2a: Following increases in compensation due to competition in a 
local labor market, firms in the market that have employees in directly exposed 
establishments are more likely to increase compensation for the employees in their 
demographically similar directly exposed establishments than for those in more 
demographically dissimilar establishments.  
Geographic proximity.  In addition to demographic similarity, geographic 
proximity may also increase the likelihood that employees see others as salient referents 
(Luttmer, 2005).  In a study examining performance in the banking industry, for example, 
Obloj and Zenger (2017) find that increased propinquity between branches of a bank 
where employees in some branches are eligible for prizes that employees in others are not 
leads to decreased productivity by employees in the disadvantaged branches.  They 
suggest that the geographical proximity increases the salience of employees in other 
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branches as referents.  Similarly, I predict that the likelihood that compensation increases 
for employees in one establishment will lead to invidious social comparisons by 
employees in other establishments will increase as the establishments are increasingly 
geographically proximate. 
Proposition 2b: Following increases in compensation due to competition in a 
local labor market, firms in the market that have employees in directly exposed 
establishment are more likely to increase compensation for the employees in their 
geographically proximate directly exposed establishments than for those in less 
geographically distant establishments. 
Degree of Interaction. Prior research suggests that interaction across 
geographically dispersed establishments will lead to productivity benefits for multi-
location firms (Alcácer & Zhao, 2012; Singh, 2008).  Firms use explicit information and 
communication technologies, including simple technologies like email or telephone 
communications or more sophisticated technologies like the banking industry’s electronic 
data interchange protocols used to process checks (Srikanth & Puranam, 2011).  They 
also use tacit communication technologies, including technologies that allow for 
employees to observe the work progress or work context of employees in other locations 
(Srikanth & Puranam, 2011).  While these technologies may increase productivity by 
facilitating interactions, the increased interactions will also increase the likelihood that 
employees in separate locations view each other as salient referents.   
Similarly, as the interdependence of work across establishments of a firm 
increases, productivity decreases unless the firm can increase the level of communication 
and coordination between employees.  For example, Singh (2008) finds that when 
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research and development is distributed across establishments of the firm, innovative 
output decreases unless communication between employees engaged in these tasks 
increases.  With increased interaction between employees engaged in these 
interdependent tasks, firms can leverage the diverse knowledge, skills, and capabilities of 
employees in different locations to improve outputs (Alcácer & Zhao, 2012).  
Nevertheless, the increased interactions that arise from interdependent tasks across 
locations will also increase the likelihood that employees in separate locations view each 
other as salient referents.  
Therefore, I predict that the likelihood that compensation increases for employees 
in one establishment will lead to invidious social comparisons by employees in other 
establishments will increase as the interactions between employees across the 
establishments increase. 
Proposition 2c: Following increases in compensation due to competition in a 
local labor market, firms in the market that have employees in directly exposed 
establishments are more likely to increase compensation for the employees in their 
directly exposed establishments that have more interactions with employees in the focal 
establishment than for those in establishments with fewer interactions with employees in 
the focal establishment. 
Availability of Information.  As people gain information about others, even 
absent direct interactions with them, they are increasingly likely to choose others as 
salient referents (Kulik & Ambrose, 1992).  Across multi-location firms, employees in 
one establishment may learn information about employees in other establishments 
 35
through two primary pathways: interactions and information sharing internal to the firm 
and news outlets or other information intermediaries external to the firm.   
Similar to increased interactions among employees, information sharing across 
locations, particularly when there is a higher degree of interdependence of tasks across 
the locations, increase productivity.  Therefore, firms are incentivized to implement 
practices and processes to encourage information flows across establishments.  These 
include enterprise resource planning and knowledge management systems, which allow 
facilitate information flows (Newell, Huang, Galliers, & Pan, 2003).  Research also 
suggests that firms benefit from creating a unified firm culture (Barney, 1986; Gordon & 
DiTomaso, 1992; Kotter & Heskett, 1992).  Often, they do so by disseminating 
information about the firm internally (Widén-Wulff & Ginman, 2004), including about 
performance across establishments, highlighting individual and team successes.  These 
policies and systems increase information sharing within the firm and across 
establishments, but also increase the likelihood that employees in one location view 
employees in other locations as salient referents. 
Employees of the firm may also discover information about employees in other 
locations from sources external to the firm.  Media outlets may deem news about the firm 
in particular location as newsworthy and investigate and publish information about the 
firm and its employees in that location.  Industry analysts and associations, including 
career services organizations (such as Vault.com, Inc.) or industry associations (such as 
the National Association of Legal Placement, Inc.) do independent research on firms 
within an industry and publish information about performance and careers in those firms.  
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Employees themselves may publish information about the firm, including about 
compensation, on websites or blogs like GlassDoor.com.    
As employees in one establishment of the firm gain more information about 
employees in other establishments of the firm, they are more likely to see the other 
employees as salient referents.  Therefore, I predict that the likelihood that compensation 
increases for employees in one establishment will lead to invidious social comparisons by 
employees in other establishments will increase as information about employees in the 
focal establishment increases. 
Proposition 2d: Following increases in compensation due to competition in a 
local labor market, firms in the market that have employees in directly exposed 
establishments are more likely to increase compensation for the employees in their 
directly exposed establishments that have more information about employees in the 
focal establishment than for those in establishments with less information about 
employees in the focal establishment. 
Social Comparison Costs and the Extent of Compensation Increases 
The prior propositions assume that when employees feel unfairly treated, the risk 
that the employees will impose social comparison costs on the firm increases.  The firm 
will then choose to mitigate the risk by increasing the compensation of employees in 
other offices even though local labor market forces are not pressuring the firm to do so.  
Thus, the prior propositions suggest that if employees in other establishments view 
employees who receive market-based compensation increases as salient referents, they 
are more likely to feel envious and more likely to impose social comparison costs on the 
firm.  The prior propositions, however, do not address the magnitude of the potential 
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social comparison costs that employees can impose and, correspondingly, the magnitude 
of the compensation increases the firm will be willing to provide in order to avoid those 
costs.   
Adams’ (1963) equity theory posits that when people perceive inequity, they will 
make efforts to restore equity.  As discussed above, within a firm, the actions that 
employees take to restore inequity, to the extent those actions are detrimental to the firm, 
constitute the social comparison costs that employees can impose on the firm (Nickerson 
& Zenger, 2008).  It is important to note that the actions that employees take are 
proportional to the level of perceived inequity, and therefore the social comparison costs 
the firm risks incurring from an employee are also proportional to the employee’s 
perceived inequity.  Firms, therefore, should only need to raise compensation enough to 
overcome perceptions of inequity.  If the cost of the compensation increases exceeds any 
threatened social comparison costs, the firm should not raise compensation.  This 
suggests that the amount of the compensation increase firms will be willing to grant 
employees in order to restore equity is limited by the amount of social comparison costs 
they expect to incur if they do not raise compensation.  
Perceptions of Fairness—Inequality versus Inequity.  Pay inequality does not 
always equate with pay inequity, even when comparing to salient referents (Trevor, 
Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012).  When differences in pay are ascribed to differences in levels of 
the organizational hierarchy, for example, the differences in pay may be motivational 
(e.g., Kacperczyk & Balachandran, 2018).  This is a key insight of tournament theory, for 
example, which proposes that wage premiums at higher levels of the organizational 
hierarchy will incentivize workers to expend greater efforts to win the tournament and 
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receive the increased compensation as a prize (O’Reilly, III et al., 1988).  Even for 
employees who may otherwise feel envious of the higher compensation of others, the 
inequality in compensation may not be perceived as inequitable.  If firms follow fair 
procedures in allocating additional compensation to some employees but not others, for 
example, the firm’s procedural justice can satisfy the demands for equity of the 
employees (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987). 
To the extent differences in compensation are clearly connected to differences in 
the employee or job characteristics, the work environment, or the location, such 
differences also may not be perceived as inequitable.  For example, differences in the 
level of required effort, the level of required skills and education, or the level of 
productivity of employees in one location may be sufficient for employees in other 
locations to view differences in compensation as equitable.  Differences in the level of 
workplace hazards, of job complexity, or of the demands of a job may also be sufficient.  
Additionally, differences in cost of living, quality of life, and personal danger related to 
that particular location may be sufficient.  
When differences in pay based on other observed differences may not lead to 
perceptions of inequity, market-based compensation increases for the employees that do 
not also stem from or cause commensurate changes in the inputs required by employees 
may still lead to feelings of inequity by employees in other locations.  The employee 
perception may be, for example, that those employees are doing the same thing today that 
they did yesterday but receiving higher compensation.  The extent of the compensation 
increases the envious employees demand in order to overcome the perceived inequities, 
however, may not be identical to the compensation increases received by employees 
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elsewhere.  For example, if compensation is increased by a given amount for employees 
in a metropolitan location with a high cost of living, the marginal increase in 
compensation that employees in a location with a low cost of living require in order to 
feel that equity has been restored will likely be somewhat less.  Therefore, I predict that 
the compensation increases for employees in directly exposed establishments will vary 
depending on the perception of inequity perceived by those employees and those 
perceptions of inequity will be influenced by observable differences in individual 
characteristics, work environment, and location.   
Proposition 3a: Following increases in compensation due to competition in a 
local labor market, firms in the market that have employees in directly exposed 
establishments will increase compensation more for the employees in their directly 
exposed establishments that have similar individual characteristics, work environments, 
and locations to the focal environment than for those in other establishments of the firm. 
Perceptions of Social Comparison Costs—External Referents.  While the 
boundaries of a firm provide a particularly important basis for choosing salient referents 
(Cobb & Stevens, 2017), employees also compare themselves to similar employees in 
other comparable firms (Belliveau, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1996; O’Reilly, III et al., 1988).  I 
refer to employees of a firm whose compensation compares favorably to their salient 
referents in other local firms as “advantaged employees.”  While advantaged employees 
may still perceive that they have been inequitably treated when employees in other 
offices receive a market-based compensation increase, the marginal increase in 
compensation the advantaged employees need to receive in order to feel that equity has 
been restored will likely be less than employees who are not so advantaged.  Therefore, I 
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predict that if employees are already advantaged when compared to salient referents in 
other firms in their market, this will negatively moderate the compensation increases that 
advantage employees receive. 
Proposition 3b: Following increases in compensation due to competition in a 
local labor market, firms that have employees in directly exposed establishments will 
increase compensation less for the advantaged employees in their directly exposed 
establishments than their employees that are not advantaged with respect to comparable 
employees in other firms in the local labor market. 
Extent of Social Comparison Costs.  While all employees can impose social 
comparison costs on their firm—through shirking, theft, sabotage, or exiting the firm—
the extent of the costs that employees can impose may differ.  The risk associated with 
shirking, theft, sabotage, or turnover by some employees is extremely small, while for 
others it is high.  Following compensation increases for employees in one location, firms 
should increase compensation more for the employees in other locations who may impose 
greater social comparison costs on the firm. 
Replacement Costs. In some circumstances, the total social comparison costs an 
employee can impose are capped at the replacement cost of the employee.  In 
circumstances where the firm can effectively monitor employees, the firm can identify 
when employees are engaged in these detrimental activities and terminate the employee.  
These circumstances include those in which the actions of employees are independent of 
other employees, effort is easily identified, and outputs are easily measured (Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2008).  Additionally, when employees react to perceived inequities by choosing 
to voluntarily leave the firm, the social comparison costs are capped at the replacement 
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costs for the departing employees.  Therefore, I predict that the compensation increases 
for employees in directly exposed establishments will vary depending on the replacement 
costs of the employees in those establishments.   
Proposition 3b: Following increases in compensation due to competition in a 
local labor market, firms in the market that have employees in directly exposed 
establishments will increase compensation more for the employees in their directly 
exposed establishments that have higher replacement costs than for those with lower 
replacement costs. 
Opportunity for Shirking, Theft, or Sabotage.  In other circumstances, firms risk 
social comparison costs that are uncertain and may go beyond the replacement costs for 
their employees.  When monitoring employees is difficult, for example because tasks are 
highly interdependent and outcomes are only measurable at the team level (Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2008), employees have opportunities to impose costs by shirking, stealing, or 
sabotaging and the firm may have difficulty identifying the cause.  Therefore, I predict 
that the compensation increases for employees in directly exposed establishments will 
vary depending on the interdependence of the tasks in which the employees are engaged.   
Proposition 3c: Following increases in compensation due to competition in a 
local labor market, firms in the market that have employees in directly exposed 
establishments will increase compensation more for the employees in their directly 
exposed establishments whose tasks are more interdependent than for those whose tasks 
are less interdependent. 
Wage Ratchets and the Asymmetric Effects of Social Comparison 
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The prior propositions suggest that increases in compensation for employees in 
one location, due to local labor market conditions, may lead to increases in compensation 
for employees in other establishments.  The directionality of this relationship is 
intentional. Because of the nature of social comparisons, as well as the stylized fact that 
wages for employees within firms rarely decrease (e.g., Blanchflower, 1991), I expect 
that decreases in compensation in one location of a firm due to changes in local labor 
market conditions there will not spillover to other establishments of a firm.  The spillover 
effect within a firm due to compensation decreases, therefore, will not be symmetrical 
with the effect due to compensation increases. 
Social comparisons generally operate upward—salient referents are generally 
those at the same or higher social level (Zenger, 1994).  Envy arises when an individual 
perceives that the returns they receive for a level of effort are not proportional to the 
returns that others receive for their level of effort (Adams, 1963).  The possibility of this 
feeling of envy leads to the threat of social comparison costs (Nickerson & Zenger, 
2008).  When a referent’s compensation decreases without a corresponding reduction in 
level of effort, the possibility for a feeling of envy is reduced and the risk of social 
comparison costs decreases.  Therefore, social comparison costs, as well as incentives for 
the firm to compress wages downward for employees in other locations, are absent in this 
scenario.  If firms do decrease wages for the employees in other locations, it is likely a 
result of firm performance concerns rather than social comparison processes.  In this 
case, employees with other employment options are likely to voluntarily turnover rather 
than accept a wage decrease, which will keep competitive pressure on the firm to 
maintain compensation at a market levels, if possible.  
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In addition to the asymmetries inherent in social comparisons, I do not expect to 
find many instances of multi-location firms reducing compensation for employees in any 
location.  Robust empirical evidence suggests that there is a wage ratchet:  wages are 
more likely to increase over time but tend not to decrease (Blanchflower, 1991; Qualls, 
1981).  There are a number of theoretical justifications for this stylized fact, but all 
support the idea that wages are sticky downward. 
Both because social comparisons operate upward but not downward, and because 
wages tend not to decrease, I do not expect wage decreases in one establishment due to 
local labor market conditions to lead to wage decreases in other establishments absent 
other issues related to establishment or firm performance. 
Proposition 4: Following any decreases in compensation due to competition in a 
local labor market, firms in the market that also have employees in directly exposed 
establishments will not decrease compensation for employees in their directly exposed 
establishments unless the firm or that establishment face other performance-related 
issues.  
Local Labor Market Competition and the Diffusion of Compensation 
Increases 
The diffusion of compensation increases within the firm to directly exposed 
establishments, although not driven by labor market competition in the local market, will 
likely put pressure on the local labor market competitors to also raise wages.  I refer to 
the labor market competitors of directly exposed establishments as “indirectly exposed 
establishments.”  
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If the local labor market competitors do indeed raise wages, the result is a 
spillover of pay increases from one labor market to another.  The traditional mechanism 
theorized to drive the diffusion of compensation across geographic locations is the threat 
of employee mobility across the locations (Moretti, 2011).  Nevertheless, studies suggest 
that workers are reluctant to relocate even when doing so may result in increased 
compensation (Dahl & Sorenson, 2010).  The mechanism that I am proposing—diffusion 
of compensation increases through the interaction of local labor market competition and 
processes internal to multi-location firms—operates even when the threat of mobility 
across geographies is constrained and constitutes a novel explanation for compensation 
spillovers between regions. 
Proposition 5: Following compensation shocks in a local labor market, firms in 
other locations that are labor market competitors of directly exposed establishments (the 
indirectly exposed establishments) will increase compensation for their employees in the 
local market more than other firms. 
Methodological Considerations 
There are a number of empirical challenges in establishing the interaction of local 
labor market competition and social comparison processes as a mechanism driving the 
diffusion of compensation increases within firms across locations.  Firm decisions on 
compensation are not random and are potentially impacted by a number of unobservable, 
idiosyncratic employee and firm characteristics.  It is also extremely difficult to 
differentiate compensation increases due to social comparison from those caused by 
threat of worker mobility—the threat of worker mobility, particularly in the absence of 
actual worker mobility, is very difficult to observe or measure. 
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The ideal setting for an empirical examination of my propositions would require 
that at least some firms have employees in multiple locations.  In the ideal setting, the 
researcher would be able to eliminate or control for mobility across geographic locations 
in order to rule out the primary alternative explanation that the threat of employee 
mobility is driving observed compensation changes across labor markets.  Similarly, the 
researcher would be able to control for idiosyncratic individual-level and firm-level 
characteristics, such as firm-specific human capital, in order to rule those out as potential 
explanations for observed compensation changes.2   
                                                 
2 An example of research setting that has features that approximate the ideal in 
important ways is the market for associate (non-partner) attorneys in law firms.  1) 
Although the majority of law firms have only a single office, there are many law firms 
with offices in multiple locations and the number of multi-office firms is increasing 
(Baker & Parkin, 2006).  2) Employee mobility across state lines is generally limited in 
the legal services industry.  State-specific laws and state bar registration requirements, in 
addition to the relationship-based nature of the legal services industry, substantially 
increases the cost of mobility across markets.  Although there may be additional 
opportunities for mobility for lawyers when graduating from law school, the factors that 
constrain geographic mobility in the industry also generally lead law students to target 
specific geographic locations in their job searches.  Thus, the competition for new 
lawyers is fiercest among firms within a geographic location rather than across locations.  
3) Despite limited mobility, lawyers across states are generally comparable, and law firm 
associates are extremely fungible across firms.  American Bar Association accreditation 
criteria for law schools and standard bar examination requirements across states result in 
substantial homogeneity in legal education and skills.  Additionally, most newly minted 
lawyers have limited experience working in the legal services or any other industry so 
lack prior experience that may drive their compensation.  The general demands of a legal 
practice are substantially similar both within and across geographic locations.  4) Also, 
compensation, particularly for new lawyers, is widely known and easily accessible across 
locations.  Services like The American Lawyer magazine and Vault.com provide survey 
results of associate compensation for various offices of many law firms and law firms 





My goal has been to develop a more complete theory of employee value 
appropriation by emphasizing the impact of social processes within multi-location firms 
on compensation across the firms’ establishments.  In responding to local labor market 
forces, managers must balance labor market competition in one location with the risk of 
social comparison costs from employees in other locations.  Doing so may lead them to 
raise wages for employees in locations where the local labor market conditions would not 
otherwise demand it.  This discussion underscores the uniqueness of the labor market 
among resource markets for firms.  Because of the potential inimitability and unique 
value of human capital, prior strategic human capital research has identified a firm’s 
employees as a potential source of sustainable competitive advantage.  In particular, prior 
literature suggests that in situations where the mobility of employees is constrained, they 
firm may be able to enjoy economic rents.  Nevertheless, this study suggests that social 
processes within firms, and within multi-location firms in particular, may enable 
employees to appropriate value above that otherwise available to them on the local labor 
market even in the face of mobility constraints.   
Prior research has suggested that management can respond to potential social 
comparison costs primarily in three ways: compressing wages, designing the process of 
the firm to limit social comparisons, and altering the boundaries of the firm to limit social 
comparisons (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008).  This study assumes that when faced with 
local labor market competition, in the short run, multi-location firms will choose to 
compress wages of employees in order to limit social comparison costs rather than recraft 
the firm’s social architecture or restructure the boundaries of the firm.  In the long run, 
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however, firms may choose to limit the interdependence of tasks across employees or 
outsource aspects of the firms’ operations in order to limit social comparisons.  
Predictions regarding when firms will use these other levers available to them rather than 
compress wages are beyond the scope of this paper but would be worthwhile to pursue in 
future research. 
This study also has implications for income inequality.  Cobb and Stevens (2017) 
explore the implications of social comparisons and social comparison costs, particularly 
in large firms, on overall income inequality in States in the United States.  Their analysis 
suggests that large firms are more likely to compress wages, which leads to lower levels 
of income inequality in States with a larger proportion of large firms.  Similarly, this 
study has implications for levels of income inequality both within firms and within 
markets.  It seems reasonable that higher skilled workers in one establishment of the firm 
will see comparable workers in other establishments as salient referents.  Additionally, 
they will be more likely to interact with those others, more likely to have information 
about those others, and more likely to work on interdependent tasks with those others.  If 
these assumptions are true, then there is a greater risk that high skilled workers will 
impose social comparison costs on the firm if it raises compensation for comparable 
employees in other locations but not them, and therefore more likely that they will 
receive corresponding compensation increases.  Even if the low skilled workers receive 
compensation increases, high skilled workers are likely to be able to impose greater 
social comparison costs on the firm, which suggests that they are likely to receive greater 
even compensation increases than the low skilled workers.  These processes suggest that 
compensation spillovers from changes in market conditions in another establishment are 
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likely to benefit high skilled workers more than low skilled workers and lead to increased 
income inequality within the firm.  As labor market competitors of firms in these other 
locations face competitive pressure to also increase wages, the pressure will likely be 
greatest for their own comparable high-skilled workers.  If so, this would result in 
increased income inequality in the broader labor market as well.  
Finally, this study reinforces the importance of examining how social processes 
between employees within firms interact with labor market competition external to firms 
to produce outcomes we observe in the real world.  Similar to Nickerson and Zenger 
(2008), this study attempts to bring together different perspectives of human nature.  On 
the one hand, I assume that people are emotional and react to perceived inequities.  On 
the other hand, I assume that decisions makers within firms will act in rational ways to 
reduce the overall costs to the firm.  The conjunction of these two seems appropriate 
when examining organizations from both the individual- and firm-level perspectives 
simultaneously.  It seems realistic to assume that both emotional and rational processes 
intersect and interact for employees working within organizations, although a full 
exploration of the implication models is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Conclusion 
Prior research on strategic human capital has focused on isolating mechanisms 
that constrain employee mobility, restricting the ability of employees to bid up their 
compensation and limiting the extent to which they can appropriate value.  This study, 
however, suggests that for multi-location firms with establishments in different locations, 
social comparison processes within firms that lead employees to impose social 
comparison costs on the firm provide a mechanism for employees to receive increased 
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wages.  If local labor market forces pressure these firms to raise compensation in one 
location, employees who feel envious may successfully demand increased compensation 
in other locations, even if the local market conditions do not require the increases.  This 
theoretical mechanism operates regardless of the presence or lack of mobility constraints 
and suggests the importance of exploring the intersection and interaction of social 
processes between employees within firms and labor market forces external to firms 
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